My interest in the history of psychology goes back to my years as an undergraduate in Manchester, England. No psychology departments in the United Kingdom recognise the history of psychology as an area of specialisation. Anyone who wants to specialise in this area must change disciplines and become a historian of science. That is what I did. I moved to Cambridge, which has the biggest department of history and philosophy of science in the United Kingdom.

Changing disciplines was no great problem for me at the time. I had developed a strong aversion to psychology as an undergraduate and the opportunity to move to another department came as a welcome relief. What bothered me most of all was the intellectual poverty of the discipline.[1] Carrying out trivial experiments and applying 'recipe-statistics' seemed to me to be no different from standing behind a machine in a factory.[2] That was not what I had expected from higher education. I tried to switch to philosophy during my first year but was forced to abandon this move after being threatened with the loss of my scholarship.[3] It was only sheer determination that enabled me to get a first-class honours degree in a subject that I detested.

The move to history and philosophy of science had both advantages and disadvantages. I found the intellectual stimulation that had been so lacking during my undergraduate years. I also learned the craft of the historian from professional historians of science and was forced to meet their standards of historical scholarship. That got me off to a very good start. The downside to it all was the strong emphasis on the natural sciences that one often finds in departments of history and philosophy of science. My supervisor was a specialist in the history of physics--a very famous and brilliant historian of science but a specialist in the history of physics nonetheless.[4]

It was while I was writing my M.Phil. thesis that I came across the work of Kurt Danziger.[5] I was highly impressed and wrote to him to enquire about the possibility of moving to York University in order to do my Ph.D. work with him. He could provide the expertise in the history of the human sciences that was lacking in Cambridge.[6] I also noticed a commonality in our outlook and interests.[7] I was not particularly pleased about the fact that he was in a psychology department, but that was a price I was willing to pay in order to work with him.

When I arrived, I encountered Kurt Danziger's commitment to doing historical work from within psychology. He explicitly told me that the history/theory option at York University had been designed to train psychologists and not historians of science. There was a requirement to do work in some other area of psychology -preferably a mainstream one. I was very disturbed by this news and began to wonder if I had made the right decision. I still had a strong aversion to psychology and the last thing I wanted to be was a psychologist. My intention had always been to go back to history and philosophy of science.

Somewhere along the way, Kurt Danziger managed to convince me that there was an important role to play for those who were willing to do historical work from within psychology and I began to share his views on this subject. He convinced me to such an extent that, when my old supervisor tried to lure me back to Cambridge with the offer of a three-year fellowship in history and philosophy of science, I turned it down. I cannot put a precise date on when this change occurred but I can talk about the arguments that succeeded in convincing me.

Some of these arguments can be found in Kurt Danziger's article, "Does the History of Psychology Have a Future?" (Danziger, 1994).[8] It contains some interesting remarks on the relationship between scientific disciplines and their history. Danziger points out that the natural sciences and the human sciences differ greatly in this regard:

The situation is very different in the human sciences:

The end result is that historical studies continue to play an important role in the human sciences:

All this can explain my own odyssey from psychology to history and philosophy of science and back to psychology. Work on the history of the natural sciences is done mainly by historians of science. Work on the history of the human sciences is done mainly by the scientists themselves. This situation is probably at its most extreme in economics where virtually all of the work on the history of economics is done by economists (Schabas, 1992).

Psychology is like the human sciences in that most of the work on the history of psychology is done by psychologists. It also resembles the human sciences in that it has an agonistic structure with deep divisions between alternative schools of thought. The two things are, of course, connected. It is this agonistic structure which encourages some psychologists to take an interest in the history of their discipline.

Psychology differs from the human sciences, however, in that most of its practitioners have adopted what they consider to be a natural science approach. This brings with it a certain view of the relationship between psychology and its history:

A trend towards the history of psychology being taken up by historians, rather than psychologists, can already be seen in the United States. Names like Mitchell Ash, James Capshew, John Carson, Deborah Coon, Ellen Herman, Richard von Mayrhauser, Michael Sokal and Leila Zenderland will be familiar to those who attend the meetings of the Cheiron Society. Historians of science are moving away from their traditional emphasis on the natural sciences and more and more work on the history of psychology is being done. This trend can be expected to continue in the future. The Forum for the History of the Human Sciences was established within the History of Science Society in order to encourage work in these areas.[9] It raises an interesting question: could the history of psychology eventually be taken over by historians of science?

There are reasons to believe that it will continue to be a part of psychology as well. It will continue to have a pedagogical function and to be used on appropriate ceremonial occasions (Ash, 1983; Harris, 1980). The agonistic structure of the discipline will also ensure that some critical work is done. On the other hand, I do not think that the possibility of it becoming predominantly a branch of history of science can be ruled out. It may come about because the general lack of interest in "history" among the majority of psychologists and their unwillingness to support historical research.[10]

Along with Kurt Danziger, I would be disturbed by such a development. History of science departments may be supportive of historical work and historians of science do not have to face the negative reactions that a reflective or critical history can often arouse (Forman, 1991). This may seem like an enviable situation until one realises that it comes at a price:

This situation helps to preserve the status quo. Work that is critical of science is hidden away in places where scientists are unlikely to see it. The institutional separation of history of science from the various sciences also helps to strengthen the view that history is irrelevant to the practice of science.

I should emphasise that this is not a territorial dispute. I welcome the growing interest of historians of science in the history of the human sciences. Much more work on the history of psychology--and, in particular, critical work--is being done as a result. Clearly, this would not happen if the discipline of psychology was its only source of support. The work of historians of science also allows for a greater exposure of psychologist-historians to professional standards of historical scholarship. All this can only benefit our field. The problem remains, however, that the audience of historians of science usually consists of other historians of science.

This is why it is so important to maintain a presence within psychology. Historians of science are rarely asked to teach in psychology departments. They cannot become members of professional associations for which a Ph.D. in psychology is required. They cannot serve on the editorial boards of psychology journals. When they teach in psychology departments, speak at psychology conferences, or write for psychology journals, they do so at the invitation of psychologists and have the status of "guests." Like all guests, they have to be on their best behaviour or they will not be invited again.

The situation is very different for those of us whose primary affiliation is with psychology. We can teach in psychology departments. We can become members of professional associations and hold positions of power. We can serve on editorial boards. We can even invite historians of science to speak at our meetings and to publish in our journals. That would provide them with an opportunity to address an audience of scientists. These remarks concern psychology, but they could be applied to any branch of science whose history has become institutionally separate from the science itself. They may be more relevant to psychology because of its unique status as a discipline with an agonistic structure that is typical of the human sciences and a relationship to its history that is typical of the natural sciences.[11]

I have a reason for drawing attention to this aspect of Kurt Danziger's work. There is considerable support for the view that Section 25 should separate from CPA and meet with the Learned Societies (Kelly & McDonald, 1995). I know that Kurt Danziger is opposed to such a move and so am I. The Canadian Society for History and Philosophy of Science already meets with the Learned Societies. They have papers on the history and philosophy of psychology on their programme every year. Anyone who wants to meet with the Learned Societies can submit their papers to this organisation. A separate organisation for history and philosophy of psychology would seem to be superfluous at best.

It is, of course, no accident that Canadian historians and philosophers of science meet with the Learned Societies. As Kurt Danziger points out, they work in isolation from the community of scientists. They have separate departments, separate conferences and separate journals. Their work does not--and cannot be expected to--have an influence on the practice of science. Moreover, the institutional separation of their work helps to strengthen the view that history and philosophy of science is irrelevant to the practice of science. The important issue is whether or not history and philosophy will continue to have a presence in scientific organisations. A voluntary withdrawal would be an abandonment of the inroads that have been made.

Notes:

1. I developed an interest in "psychology" after reading the work of writers such as Rom Harré and John Shotter. I did not realise at the time that this work was in no way representative of the subject that I was about to study.

2. The undergraduate degree in Britain contains a much larger empirical component than its equivalent in North America.

3. It would have been impossible to continue without a scholarship. The choice was therefore "psychology or nothing."

4. The person in question is Simon Schaffer who is perhaps best known for a book that he co-authored with Steven Shapin on the rise of experimental physics (Shapin and Schaffer, 1985).

5. My M.Phil. thesis was a re-examination of the famous "imageless thought" controversy involving Wundt, Titchener, and the Würzburg School (Brock, 1990). Kurt Danziger had already published work on this subject (e.g., Danziger, 1980a, 1980b).

6. Kurt Danziger has published in journals devoted to the history, philosophy, and sociology of science (e.g., Danziger, 1983a, 1985a, 1992). His work is well-known and respected among specialists in these fields.

7. I am referring here to Danziger's social approach to the history of science (e.g., Danziger, 1979a, 1985b) and to our common interest in Wundt (e.g., Danziger, 1979b, 1983b).

8. The article is based on invited addresses presented to the History and Philosophy Sections of the Canadian Psychological Association and the British Psychological Society and to Division 26 of the American Psychological Association. Each one has a different focus. The address presented to APA Div. 26 deals with this topic in more depth (Danziger, 1993, August). I have chosen to focus on the article because it is more readily available.

9. The Forum meets with the History of ScienceSociety every year and publishes a newsletter. For information on membership, contact Richard von Mayrhauser [e-mail: ].

10. It is perhaps worth noting that sociologists who read Durkheim or Weber typically regard their work not as history but as sociology. This is not the case with psychologists who read Wundt or James. The mere decision to label such work "history" is already a reflection of the ahistorical orientation of the discipline. Psychologists should be wary of accepting this label.

11. The process is not yet complete. As Danziger points out: "departments of physics and chemistry are not in the habit offering courses in the history of their subjects" (1994, p. 467). This is at least a tacit acknowledgement that historical studies still have a role to play within psychology. The fact that such courses are typically labelled "history and systems" suggests that they are designed to help students cope with the existence of different approaches to the subject (Brock, 1993).

Ash, M. G. (1983). The self-presentation of a discipline: History of psychology in the United States between pedagogy and scholarship. In L. Graham, P. Weingart and W. Lepenies (Eds.), Functions and uses of disciplinary histories (pp. 143-189). Dordrecht/Boston: Reidel.

Brock, A. (1990). Imageless thought or stimulus error: The social construction of private experience. In W. R. Woodward and R. S. Cohen (Eds.), World views and scientific discipline formation (pp. 97-106). Dordrecht/Boston: Kluwer.

Brock, A. (1993). Something old, something new: The "reappraisal" of Wilhelm Wundt in textbooks. Theory and Psychology, 3, 235-242.

Danziger, K. (1979a). The social origins of modern psychology. In A. R. Buss (Ed.), Psychology in social context (pp. 27-45). New York: Irvington.

Danziger, K. (1979b). The positivist repudiation of Wundt. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 15, 205-230.

Danziger, K. (1980a). The history of introspection reconsidered. Journal of the History of the Behavioral Sciences, 16, 241-262.

Danziger, K. (1980b). Wundt's psychological experiment in the light of his philosophy of science. Psychological Research, 42, 109-122.

Danziger, K. (1983a). Origins of the schema of stimulated motion: Towards a prehistory of modern psychology. History of Science, 21, 183-210.

Danziger, K. (1983b). Origins and basic principles of Wundt's Völkerpsychologie. British Journal of Social Psychology, 22, 303-313.

Danziger, K. (1985a). The methodological imperative in psychology. Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 15, 1-13.D

Danziger, K. (1985b). The origins of the psychological experiment as a social institution. American Psychologist, 40, 133-140.

Danziger, K. (1992). The project of an experimental social psychology. Science in Context, 5, 309-328.

Danziger, K. (1993, August). Three challenges for the history of psychology. Invited address presented to Division 26 at the 101st annual convention of the American Psychological Association in Toronto, Ontario.

Danziger, K. (1994). Does the history of psychology have a future? Theory and Psychology, 4, 467-484.

Forman, P. (1991). Independence, not transcendence, for the historian of science. Isis, 82, 71-86.

Harris, B. (1980). Ceremonial versus critical history of psychology. American Psychologist, 35, 218-219.

Kelly, B. N., & McDonald, M. (1995). Where we meet and why? History and Philosophy of Psychology Bulletin, 7(1), 4-5.

Schabas, M. (1992). Breaking away: History of economics as history of science. History of Economics, 24, 187-203.

Shapin, S. and Schaffer, S. (1985). Leviathan and the air-pump: Hobbes, Boyle and the experimental life. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Adrian Brock is College Lecturer in Psychology at University College Dublin, Ireland.